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developments around the globe, including yielding financial and political crises in developed 
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Approach/Methodology/Design: While  a number of studies discuss the impact of finance on 
political and societal reality, research on the interlink between finance and democratic 
processes is very limited. Drawing on secondary literature and a case study of two young 
Central-European democracies, this paper contends a relationship between financial 
economy and democratic backsliding.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Advanced democratic systems constitute themselves typically as social market 
economies, where the potentially adverse effects of the liberalized market should be 
counterbalanced by regulatory and mitigated by social policy instruments, with the 
latter aimed at protecting the weaker individual or entity. Since the rise of 
neoliberalism the commitment of governments to this theoretical model of social 
policy varies significantly depending on the condition of public finances and/ or 
political choices invoking more or less objective factorsi. At the same time a trend of 
national governments’ curtailing social welfare instruments may be observed, further 
exacerbated in the context of the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis.  
 
However, the impact of the most recent global financial crisis went far beyond the 
challenges to the European welfare states. As argued by Fukuyama (2018) “policies 
crafted by elites produced huge recessions, high unemployment, and falling incomes 
for millions of ordinary workers. Since the United States and the EU were the 
leading exemplars of liberal democracy, these crises damaged the reputation of that 
system as a whole.” In a speech held by the French President Macron to the 
Diplomatic Corps on 27 August 2018 such facts were fully admitted at highest 
political level. In his view «le commerce n'est pas équitable au niveau 
international » (trade at the international level is not fair) and « la mondialisation a 
construit des inégalités qui ne sont plus soutenables» (globalization has caused 
inequalities that are no longer sustainable). If - as claimed by Inglehart (2018) - we 
are indeed experiencing the most severe democratic setback since the rise of fascism 
in the 1930s, a vexing question arises as to its causes.   
 
This paper links in with a very limited scholarly output on the hypothesized impact 
of financial globalisation on democracy. Studies in sociology, economics and 
political science mainly focus on the manner in which democratic politics impact on 
economic policy and performance (Gasiorowski, 2000; Converse and Kaptsein, 
2006; Hartmann, 2018) offering, however, no explicit assertions as to the possible 
reverse direction of causality. Some studies have already hinted to a possible link 
between unequal distribution of resources and declining trust in the quality of 
governance (Eurofound, 2018), not excluding an eventual decline of democracy 
(Inglehart, 2018). Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find no significant 
relationship between countries' level of democracy and their average social security 
spending.  
 
Alesia and Dani (1994) provide empirical evidence to the effect that inequality in 
wealth and income distribution is negatively correlated with subsequent economic 
growth, thus hinting at the dynamics of the future social choice that rational/ median 
voters need to internalise when casting their vote. Clarke (1992) also finds negative 
and robust correlation between inequality and long-term economic growth, 
irrespective of political regime of a given polity (a democracy or a non democracy). 
Finally, Roberts and Kwon (2017) point to the correlation between the growth in 
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financial sectors and higher income inequality. In this paper we assume that such 
financialisation of the economy (Krippner, 2010) not only fuels the accumulation of 
excessive risk in the system, but also produces unwelcome externalities in terms of 
reduced inclusiveness of economic policies and erosion of support for liberal values, 
thus creating a susceptible ground for democratic backsliding. 
 
In the sections below, we first elucidate how the concept of democratic backsliding 
is applied in the present article. Drawing on the available literature we then provide a 
brief account of the financial markets’ contribution to inequality of income and 
wealth distribution. Against this backdrop, we look into the causes of democratic 
setback in Poland and Hungary and presume possible indirect impact of financial 
economy on the rule of law as a core pillar of democratic order. Subsequently we 
postulate the necessity to re-embed the market within the society and its institutions, 
including by way of regulatory and judicial autonomy of public authorities at 
national and transnational/ international level. We conclude by articulating research 
opportunities and limitations due to the adopted theoretical approach.  
  
2. Democratic Backsliding: An Institutional and Societal Phenomenon 
 
Civilized nationsii - to use a concept applied by the International Court of Justice - 
recognize certain general principles of law, including those relating to core 
democratic norms and practices. Equality (also understood as equal opportunities for 
all), rule of law, minority rights, separation of powers and checks and balances on 
executive power are considered as core pillars of democracy. They are regularly 
enshrined in written or unwritten constitutions, while their implementation in 
political practice may vary from country to country and from one era to another. In 
this sense they may also constitute a telling benchmark to assess the state of 
democracy in any modern society. 
 
Nancy Bermeo (2016, p. 5-6) defines democratic backsliding as “the state-led 
debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing 
democracy”. According to the author, democratic backsliding may consequently 
lead to a serious weakening of existing democratic institutions or, in more extreme 
cases, an outright democratic breakdown where rapid and radical changes across a 
broad range of institutions yield an authoritarian regime. At least in theory, 
weakening or disassembling of democratic institutions may be performed with an 
intention of deepening rather than dismantling democracy. This may be the case 
when, e.g. the impetus for institutional change is given by marginalized groups 
which demand a more inclusive and responsive democratic model (op.cit., p. 16). 
Thus a deeply dysfunctional political system may legitimize anti system behavior 
(Howe 2017, p. 22). As argued by Hartmann (2018) “if democratic systems do not 
offer a robust framework for ensuring rule of law and opportunities for political 
participation, and if market-based economies do not guarantee fair and reliable 
rules of competition and social inclusion, then not only will they lose their appeal, 
they will devolve into illiberal, patronage-driven structures.” 
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Amongst contemporary forms of democratic backsliding named by Bermeo 
executive aggrandizement and strategic electoral manipulation may be observed 
even in states which are (or at least were) considered as stable democracies. While 
the latter of the said forms of democratic backsliding may be somewhat self-
explanatory (notably in the light of the alleged manipulation of the US presidential 
elections of November 2016 or the Brexit vote of June 2016), the former requires a 
brief explanation. Executive aggrandizement manifests itself in that the elected 
executives weaken checks on executive power by means of a series of institutional 
changes that hamper the power of the opposition or of the judiciary to challenge 
executive preferences. As pointed out by Bermeo (2016, p. 10f) “disassembling of 
institutions that might challenge the executive is done through legal channels, often 
using newly elected constitutional assemblies or referenda. Existing courts or 
legislatures may also be used, in cases where supporters of the executive gain 
majority control of such bodies.”  
 
Given that institutional change is typically legitimated by some kind of vote or 
“legally decreed” by a freely elected official, it can be framed as having resulted 
from a democratic mandate. It may perhaps be somewhat traceable that countries 
such as Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Turkey or Ukraine have in most recent history become a 
site for executive aggrandizement. However, the fact that democratic decomposition 
of this kind may currently be observed also amidst Central European countries 
(notably Hungary, Poland and for a certain period in Romania) is somewhat 
disconcerting. While an attempt to elaborate on the origins of executive 
aggrandizement in Poland and Hungary will be undertaken later in this paper, suffice 
it to say here that widespread discontent with the operation of the democratic system 
and mistrust towards political institutions, justified as they may be, are not enough to 
explain the ever increasing erosion in support for democratic principles. Moreover, it 
seems that many Western democracies nourished an illusion to be immune to the 
problem of democratic decline. On the contrary, support for foundational principles 
of the democratic system seems to be waning even in some well-established 
democracies.iii 
 
In his article Eroding norms and democratic deconsolidation Paul Howe (2017) 
blames the rise of antidemocratic sentiment more on the corrosive changes in the 
social and cultural landscape rather than the dysfunction in the political arena. He 
sees hostile and aggressive attitudes as a salient component of an antisocial mindset. 
As the author says, “[i]t is reasonable to think that the disdain …[some] individuals 
show for democratic principles may flow less from an assessment of institutional 
dysfunction (the current democratic system is so flawed that democracy’s rules must 
be bent) than from an underlying intemperate and unprincipled mindset” (Howe 
2017, p. 24). One possible explanation for such antisocial attitudes presented by 
some individuals is their socioeconomic status. Limited education and poor life 
prospects result in the feeling of alienation and distrust. An empirical study on 
sentiments in the US population about core democratic norms and principles seems 
to confirm this hypothesis. Drawing on the data from the World Values Survey 
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(WVS), it is younger citizens who are most likely to express a weaker sense of 
attachment to democracy and a wide range of socially accepted norms, while 
showing tolerance for various illegal and antisocial behaviours. Noteworthy in this 
regard is an observable strong positive correlation between education and support for 
democratic norms and values, with ignorant or disdainful disposition being 
substantially more common among less-educated sections of US society. As 
observed by Howe (2017, p. 27) “[i]f survey respondents, especially those who are 
younger and who have fewer socioeconomic advantages, sometimes dismiss 
democracy because they do not care much about important social norms, they may 
also, in many instances, simply not know enough to care. Their indifference to 
democracy may partly reflect a relatively facile and ill-informed understanding of 
the political world”. Such attitudes, however, are likely to be exacerbated in 
constitutional orders the democratic institutions of which are debilitated or defunct.  
 
3. Financial Markets’ Contribution to Inegalitarian Societies 
 
Well functioning democracies are expected to fairly balance conflicting interests in a 
society, thereby protecting minority rights from any tyranny by majorities. Under the 
auspices of neo-liberal capitalism, towards which Western democracies have 
evolved, ironically, the rules of the game allow for a diktat of financial elites which 
do not hesitate to put at stake the stability of the financial system in pursuit of profit. 
The manner in which financial markets are organised only fuels the production of so 
much risk. As aptly observed by Goldstein and Fligstein (2017, p. 507), “[b]y 
problematizing how banks make money and seeking to understand the underlying 
conception of control, it is possible to see how organizational structures play a 
pivotal role in both the opportunities and crises produced by capitalism.” The 
structuring of the US mortgage securitization market allowed banks to generate 
record profits from 2001 to 2007. However, the downturn in the mortgage-backed 
securities of mid-2007 resulted in the most spectacular financial collapse since the 
Great Depression (ibid.), destabilising financial sector worldwide. Ever increasing 
foreign indebtedness under the premises of “globalisation” has granted World Bank 
and IMF economists power over sovereign nations (Pettifor, 2017). More than a 
decade afterwards, the social cost of public capital injection in failing financial 
institutions has not yet been internalised.  
 
Interestingly, crisis inducing forces seem to have just as much to do with excessive 
risk-taking as with stagnation. Thomas Piketty perceives a plausible causality 
between the structural increase of inequality and the financial crisis. He points to the 
United States where the share of the upper decile in US national income peaked 
twice in the past century, namely in 1928 and 2007, each time on the eve of the crash 
of 1929 and 2008, respectively. He stresses that the reason behind the increase of 
inequality in US (and elsewhere) and the nation’s financial instability is the 
stagnation of purchasing power of the lower and middle class. This inevitably 
inclines modest households to take on debt, “especially since unscrupulous banks 
and financial intermediaries, freed from regulation and eager to earn good yields on 
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the enormous savings injected into the system by well-to-do, offered credit on 
increasingly generous terms” (Piketty, 2014) In the light of figures demonstrating 
the significant increase of the inequality in the distribution of wealth in the US 
between 1977 and 2007iv, Piketty argues that an economy and society with such 
extreme divergence between social groups may not continue to function indefinitely 
(2014, Section: Did the Increase of Inequality Cause the Financial Crisis). 
Moreover a core question arises as to the legitimacy of such disproportionate wealth 
distribution in modern societies. In terms of political choices, the allure of future 
well-being continues to seduce majorities of the population to vote in favor of neo-
liberal political forces, despite their promises remaining by and large unfulfilled. 
Even if robust correlation between high levels of inequality and economic stagnation 
do not necessarily mean causality, the conventional narrative that inequality is a 
necessary precondition for growth has been convincingly overhauled (Clarke 1992). 
 
From the geopolitical perspective, the concept of equal opportunities for all could 
constitute a just and relevant counterbalance to unrestricted market forces. The 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO)v 
adopted on 1 May 1974 by the United Nation’s General Assembly 3201 (S-VI) 
partly endorsed the emerging market players’ call for a regulatory framework 
protecting weaker economies. (Aggarwal and Weber, 2012). The general strategy of 
the rich countries was to broadly reject the NIEO. Instead of implementing its noble 
postulates they pursued their own economic interests. 
 
It would be illusive to believe that transition or emerging economies themselves 
have drawn lessons from demerits of Western capitalism. The economic transition in 
the post communist countries has ignited an outstandingly rapid redistribution of 
income. As observed by Hellman (1998, pp. 224-225), “[s]ince the beginning of the 
transition, the level of income inequality has risen in every post communist country 
with the exception of the Slovak Republic. The average Gini coefficient - one of the 
standard measures of inequality - for the entire region jumped by one-third, from 24 
in 1987-88 to 32 in 1993-94, a pace virtually unprecedented in the postwar era. In a 
time span of five to seven years the transition economies have moved from inequality 
levels below those of most OECD countries to, in several cases, levels on a par with 
or higher than the most unequal OECD countries.”  
 
In the same vein, inequalities in poor or emerging economies are not necessarily 
lower than in rich economies. On the contrary, Piketty provides data demonstrating 
that the top centile’s share of national income in poor and emerging economies is 
more or less the same as in the rich economies (2014, p. 233, Figure 9.9)vi. In the 
case of China from the nearly Scandinavian level of less than 5 per cent in the mid-
1980s, the upper centile’s share of national income increased rapidly over the last 
decades reaching 10-11 per cent for the period of 2000-2010, being still below the 
levels reached in India or Indonesia (12-14 per cent, approximately the level for 
Britain and Canada) or in Argentina and South Africa (16-18 per cent, 
approximately the level for the United States). According to Piketty the initial 
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egalitarian distribution of national income may easily be attributed to the country’s 
Communist system with its characteristic compressed wage schedule and absence of 
private capital. In turn the liberalization of the economy in the 1980s and the 
accelerated growth between 1990-2000 translate into ever increasing inequality in 
China. This development may clearly be vexing in many respects. Confronting the 
very high official growth figures for developing countries (notably India and China) 
with the available data on income taxes, Piketty complains about “the lack of 
information and democratic transparency”.and blames a possible deterioration of 
sources on “a certain disaffection with the progressive income tax (…) on the part of 
certain governments and international organizations”. He suspects that in those 
countries inequality has reached a more staggering degree than shown by the data 
because the best remunerated individuals whose incomes are not always included in 
the available tax data, are taking a disproportionate share in the growth of output 
(2014, p. 234).vii 
 
Piketty concludes with the following apposite statement: “a market economy based 
on private property, if left to itself, contains powerful forces of convergence, 
associated in particular with the diffusion of knowledge and skills; but it also 
contains powerful forces of divergence, which are potentially threatening to 
democratic societies and the values of social justice on which they are based” 
(2014, p. 398.). In other words, ever growing inequalities in contemporary societies 
and their subordination to economic interests of the few tend to boost extremisms 
(Jesse and Thieme, 2011, p. 479) and eventually democratic backsliding. The 
worrying effects may already be seen in some young democracies which at first 
appeared promising in terms of political stability.  
 
A glance at publicly available data seems to confirm the hypothesis of a significant 
role and impact of the financial sector in the processes of transformation leading to a 
liberal market economy. In Poland e.g. domestic credit provided by the financial 
sector nearly doubled twice in two subsequent periods of ten years. Expressed in % 
of the GDP it rose from 18,4% in 1990 to 34,3% in 2000 and 63,2% in 2010, 
subsequently increasing only slowly up to 73,5% in 2018. The data available for 
Greece show an increase from 92,7% in 2004 to 137,8% in 2014 and a setback to 
91,9% in 2018. For Hungary they show an increase from 54,4% in 2000 to 60,3% in 
2014 and a setback to 54,7% in 2018 whereas for the Czech Republic an increase 
from 45,4% in 2000 to 62,7% in 2010 with a peak of 72,5% in 2014 and a setback to 
63,1% in 2018 was recorded. In the Slovak Republic the share rose from 65,3% in 
2009 to 79,4% in 2018. In comparison the same data were rather stable in highly 
developed economies like in Germany (evolving from 134,2% in 2004 to 125,9% in 
2018 with a peak of 164,8% in 2010) or in the Netherlands (evolving from 157,5% 
in 2004 to 176,8% in 2018 with a peak of 231,4% in 2012.  
 
Looking to other indicators, the stock market turnover ratioviii evolved in Poland 
from an initial peak with 69,5% in the year 2000 to stability at lower level with 
32,4% in 2004 and 30,5% in 2008, a second peak with 51% in 2009, subsequently 
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continuously falling reaching a low of 30,8% in 2014 and since then modestly 
increasing again up to 39,4% in 2018. In the same period the bank return on assets 
after taxesix amounted to 1,3% in 2000 and then varied between 2,4% in the peak 
year 2004 and a low of 0,7% in 2009, subsequently stabilizing around 1% until 
2018.  
 
For Greece, the stock market turnover ratio showed a similar development with 
peaks in 2000 (66,3%) and 2009 (60,2%), then continuously falling – 
notwithstanding an intermediate recovery in 2014 – to 31,2% in 2016 and 34,5% in 
2017. The bank return on assets after taxes was negative (worst in 2011 with -8,5%) 
except for the years 2004-2009 (between 1,1 and 0%) and 2016 (+1,1%). In the 
Czech Republic the stock market turnover ratio increased from 68,6% in 2000 to 
81,4 in 2004 and subsequently fell to a low of 28,1% in 2012, the further 
development not being reported. The bank return on assets after taxes was positive 
throughout the whole period, increasing from 0,4% in 2000 to 1,5% in 2004 and 
subsequently varying between 1,3% and 1,8%.  
 
In Hungary the stock market turnover ratio fell from 92,9% in 2000 to 59,9% in 
2004, but again increased to reach a peak of 118,4% in 2009 with a subsequent 
continuous decline to 42,1% in 2014 and 37,9% in 2017. After positive results in the 
years 2000 (1%), 2004 (2,2%) the bank return on assets after taxes diminished to 
0,2% in 2010 and showed negative rates varying between –0,5% and -0,9% in the 
years from 2011 to 2014, subsequently recovering again to reach 1,9% in 2016. In 
the Slovak Republic the stock market turnover ratio in the year 2000 amounted to 
125,3%. In the year 2004 it had fallen to 38,4%. Since then it remained below 10% 
with a low of 0,3% in 2008 and a maximum of 9,2% in 2011. The bank return on 
assets after taxes showed little variation. After a maximum of 1,3% in 2004 and a 
minimum of 0,5% in 2009 it tended to stabilize around 0,9%. In comparison the 
same indicators show quite different a picture for advanced economies. In Germany 
the stock market turnover ratio was falling from 145,9% in 2000 to 99,3% in 2004 
and reached a peak of 247,8% in 2008, subsequently continuously fell to a low of 
69,1% in 2014 from which it recovered to 78,1% in 2017. The bank return on assets 
after taxes showed only small variations with a peak of 0,3% in 2000 and a low of -
0,3% in 2008, since 2012 it stabilized at a rate of 0,1%.  
 
In the Netherlands the stock market turnover ratio increased from 104,3% in 2000 to 
135,3% in 2008, then fell continuously to reach 59% in 2014 (latest available data). 
The bank return on assets after taxes fell from 1,3% in 2000 to 0,9% in 2004, was 
negative (-1,5%/-0,2%) in 2008/2009 and recovered slowly but steadily from 2011 
(0,2%) to reach 0,6% in 2016 x.  
 
Alike any other economic data those recorded here cannot demonstrate any possible 
impact of the financial business on the course of democratic governance. Any 
assumption of such impact can only be based on a critical evaluation of multi-
faceted observations. What the data exposed above may, however, demonstrate is 
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the structurally different impact of the financial industry on an economy that is 
subject to a process of transformation or a deep crisis, compared to an economy that 
is fully developed and prosperous. Such structural differences justify looking more 
closely at the role of the financial sector in emerging democracies.   
 
3.1 Financial Markets and Privatization in Emerging Democracies 
 
Research by Rodríguez and Santiso (2011) suggests that international banks favour 
lending to new emerging democracies and that their lending activity correlates 
positively with the level of democratisation as measured by different indicators. The 
authors refer to other studies which insinuate that government ownership of banks 
around the world is associated with weak protection of property rights, lower 
productivity, weak bank performance and low levels of financial development. The 
authors’ observation that state-controlled financial systems tend to promote political 
rather than profit-maximizing objectives (Rodríguez and Santiso, 2011, p. 14) 
acknowledges what is desirable from the point of view of public interest.  
 
Other empirical research referred to in the study points to a relationship between 
democratization process and fiscal policy. It assumes that democratically elected 
politicians are inclined to minimize taxation and maximize spending on social 
security, education, etc., thus increasing budget deficits. According to the authors 
“emerging democracies’ financial needs tend to increase in the very first years of 
their existence, leading them to boost their borrowing activity and to become 
potentially good clients of international banks”. However, as observed by Converse 
and Kaptsein (2006) initial increases in public spending of young democracies are 
followed later by a long-term decline. Traces of political budget cycles seem to 
appear typically in the first four elections following democratization (Brender and 
Drazen, 2004). The concluding assumption by Rodríguez and Santiso (2011) is that 
bankers’ preferences of emerging democracies, apart from solid economic grounds, 
may additionally lie in ethical considerations, such as “a pledge of support for 
democracy, freedom and responsible public order”.  
 
Motivation by allegedly Karl Popper inspired  “professional ethic” is not quite 
convincing when one takes into account the social cost of excessive indebtedness of 
young democracies to which financial institutions directly contribute. On top of that, 
“[t]he gaps in the legal architecture (…) have led to the emergence and growth of 
so-called vulture funds, [i.e.] hedge funds whose business model is based on 
exploiting the deficiencies in the rule of law that they helped shape” (Guzman and 
Stieglitz, 2016, p. 3). Vulture funds purchase bonds of defaulting countries (by 2010, 
26 governments are said to have been affected, among others Argentina, Ecuador 
and Greece) at prices significantly lower than their nominal value, typically issued 
under US or British law. They subsequently sue the issuer for repayment of their 
debts at face value plus interest, including punitive interest and litigation costs, 
amounting to rates of return of between 200 percent and 3.000 per cent 
(Bohoslavsky and Goldmann, 2016, p. 27). The rise in holdout litigation poses a 
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direct threat to the promotion of sovereign debt sustainability under international 
law. It also creates moral hazard of other creditors being inclined to follow the same 
example instead of engaging in debt restructuring negotiations. In October 2014 the 
UN Human Rights Council condemned the activity of vulture funds for paralysing 
the international debt restructuring efforts and its negative impact on the capacity of 
indebted developing countries to create the necessary conditions for the 
advancement of human rights, including the right to development. 
 
To sum up the considerations of this section, international banks are not only 
increasingly lending to newly emerging democracies, but they also clearly prefer 
those emerging democracies where policies are stable, while remaining indifferent to 
instability of democracy. Rodríguez and Santiso admit that banks may rush towards 
emerging democracies not because they are democracies but because windows of 
opportunity like privatizations have suddenly opened: “Privatization operations are 
highly attractive for banks, implying high fees for those involved as advisers and 
lucrative lending operations to finance takeovers by private operators.” This 
explains their high interest for new democracies in regions like Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, where privatization was particularly intensive, notably in the first 
stages of economic liberalization (Rodríguez and Santiso, 2011, pp. 38, 18, 25, 
respectively). 
 
3.2 Explaining the Illiberal Turn in Central Europe  
 
The capacity of young democracies to maintain popular support may partly rely on 
the ability of governments to deliver economic policies that meet with widespread 
approval (Converse and Kaptsein, 2006). A short glance at where some young 
European democracies are only three decades after the overthrow of the Communist 
regime may overshadow the cheers of the economic development. Even when 
idiosyncratic, the narratives of democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary repeat 
certain identifiable schemata: judicial autonomy and media freedom have become 
prime sites for governmental interference, accompanied by the consolidation of 
executive power and undermining institutions of accountability - all with the 
justification of a strong popular mandate to rule. 
 
Poland and Hungary constitute the most striking cases where the currently 
observable illiberal and nationalist political turn, at least in some respects, may be 
explained by pathologies of liberal governance in Central and Eastern Europe (see 
notably Plattner. 2019; Karolewski and Benedikter 2017). In the context of their 
transformation processes, both countries perfectly demonstrate “the complex 
interdependencies between democratization and economic liberalization – including 
the possibility of blockades and failure” (Hartmann, 2018). 
 
Neoliberal capitalism introduced in both countries in 1989-1990 was the main 
driving force of their transition from Communism to market economies. Poland and 
Hungary count amongst the few transition economies which were capable of 
I. Jędrzejowska-Schiffauer, P. Schiffauer, G. Noje 
  
225  
developing the necessary institutional framework to enforce the protection of 
property rights and create investment-friendly business environment (see Beck and 
Laeven, 2005, p. 2 and the literature cited therein). Economic growth and an increase 
of average living standards count amongst undeniable positive effects of the 
undergone transformation. However, the privatization processes’ lack of 
transparency and lagging institutional reforms manifested specific governance 
pathologies in Central and Eastern European states. Karolewski and Benedikter 
(2017) point out that “despite positive macroeconomic development, both young 
people and senior citizens in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] have endured 
existential pressures for many years with governments unable, and partly unwilling, 
to strengthen the welfare systems and balance growing social inequality. (…) In 
both Poland and Hungary, the sentiment was broadly shared in society that 
numerous governments after 1989 used state agencies and enterprises for cronyism 
and politico-economic clientelism, draining financial resources from the state 
budget that otherwise could have been invested in higher education, research, 
health, and pension systems”. The problem of clientelism is also emphasized by 
Keeper (2005). He provides evidence to the effect that in young democracies 
political competitors are unable to make credible promises to most voters. 
Consequently, upon taking office, they “underprovide public goods, over- spend on 
transfers to narrow groups, and engage in significant rent-seeking” (ibid). 
 
Not all authors share the socioeconomic narrative of the political turn in Poland. 
Kamiński (2018) ascribes it more to the rejection of the liberal mainstream. Similar 
stance is taken by Rupnik (2018) who claims that the loss of the elections by 
Poland’s Civic Platform liberals may not be attributed to the economy which was 
performing well. This view fits well in the conventional narrative where 
deteriorating or stagnant economic performance is seen as a warning signal that the 
country is at risk of democratic backsliding (see e.g. Converse and Kaptsein, 2006). 
Regarding Poland the said view is insofar mistaken as it does not account for the fact 
that the low-income Polish citizenry did not have any share in good macro-economic 
indicators and performance. Praszkier et al, (2014, pp. 13-14) identifies various 
pressing problems affecting Polish citizenry: 
 
• inertia and a social apathy, also due to lack of perspectives for the future; 
• unemployment affecting all social groups, notably young adults and workers     
          over 50;  
• social exclusion of various groups, among them disabled, mentally ill,  
          homeless and addicted; 
• drastically increasing number of debtors,  
• insufficient offer of housing for rent, resulting in significant increase of  
          heavy debt burdens for housing.  
 
In addition, “[b]anks have played a minor role in the development of social 
economy. They are reluctant to offer loans neither for the start-ups nor for the 
development of social enterprises.” (op.cit, p. 26).  Thus the words of Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt perfectly resonate also in 21st century Europe: true individual freedom 
cannot exist without economic security and independence. “Necessitous men are not 
free men.” People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which 
dictatorships are made.xi 
 
Overall, economic reforms in post communist states have generated high social cost, 
while the gains they have produced have benefited only a narrow privileged group. 
This argument is advanced by Hellman (1998) who unveils that, in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom on the politics of economic reform, the net winners of the 
process may do far more damage to its progress than its traditional net losers (i.e. 
striking workers, impoverished pensioners, unemployed, etc.).  
 
According to the author, obstacles to the progress of economic reform in post-
communist states have come “from enterprise insiders who have become new 
owners only to strip the firms’ assets; from commercial bankers who have opposed 
macroeconomic stabilization to preserve their enormously profitable arbitrage 
opportunities in distorted financial markets, from local officials who have prevented 
market entry into their regions to protect their share of local monopoly rents; and 
from so-called mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable legal 
foundation for the market economy. These actors (…) have often sought to stall the 
economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated rents for 
themselves, while imposing high costs on the rest of society” (Hellman, 1998, pp. 
204-205). Hence, instead of insulating the state from the pressure of the losers in an 
electoral backlash, Hellman calls for their political inclusion as means to constrain 
the established power of the winners of economic reform (op.cit., p. 234). 
 
Finally, the large majority of citizens of Central European states have been burdened 
not only with the effects of economic transformation from planned economy to 
market economy, but also two other transformations, namely that linked to the 
necessity to fulfil the EU accession criteria and that concerning the structural 
adjustments following the global financial crisis. Those citizens are still awaiting 
their share in the prosperity associated with becoming EU members (Hartmann, 
2018).  
 
Not surprisingly, Alesia and Dani (1994, pp. 484-485) postulate “a strong demand 
for redistribution in societies where a large section of the population does not have 
access to the productive resources of the economy”. They claim such conflict over 
distribution will have negative impact on growth. The current experience of the 
initially most reform-oriented post communist states may demonstrate that the 
conflict of distribution may endanger not only the stability of economic reform 
(Hellman, 1998), but also that of a political order. The efforts of putting democracy 
back on track must, therefore, rely on the emergence of new political coalitions that 
are prepared to reverse the trend toward inequality and ensure that the benefits of 
automation are widely shared (see e.g. Inglehart, 2018). 
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4. Uncontrolled Externalities  
 
Externalities are widely recognized and discussed phenomena in economic theory. 
Despite the voluminous literature, the concept of externality remains somewhat 
imprecise given the variety of meanings and instances that authors commonly 
ascribe to it. It has been integrated in many fields of economics and beyond 
(development, ecological economics, finance, law and economics, economic ethics, 
etc.) For the purpose of the present study, externality is to be construed as an 
incidental effect of an action or transaction on parties not involved in it (White 
2015), hence also commonly termed as third-party effect or spill-over effect.  
 
Externalities arise whenever the value of what Lin (1976, p. 1-2) calls an “objective” 
function, e.g. the profits of a firm or the happiness of an individual is affected by 
unintended or incidental by-products of some activity of others. Chemical industry 
may serve as a good example to explicate the phenomena of externalities, since the 
influence of the production process typically goes beyond the directly involved 
parties such as suppliers and employees of the producer, as well as the end 
customers. Emissions generated during the production process are discharged into 
the air, soil and water, which may significantly affect other production sectors such 
as agriculture and fisheries, diminish attractiveness of the area thus resulting 
inevitably in reduced value of property and tourist revenue, not to mention the 
adverse effects for the well being of the local population. Incidentally, unwelcome 
side effects such as marine pollution by plastic materials are also caused by the end 
users of industrial products. Such external diseconomies may not remain 
unaccounted for when evaluating economic welfare, as benefits and costs seen by 
private individuals differ from the overall social cost consequences of their actionsxii. 
In effect, in the presence of externalities, decentralized decision making may fail to 
produce an optimal allocation of resources for the society (ibid.).xiii 
 
Some authors conceive of externalities in terms of absence of markets or their failure 
to operate properly. According to Heller and Starrett (1976, p. 10), externality occurs 
when “private economy lacks sufficient incentives to create a potential market in 
some good and the nonexistence of this market results in losses in Pareto 
efficiency”. Consequently, setting up markets for externality rights is proposed as an 
adequate remedy (op.cit., p. 20). This may hardly, however, be considered as a way 
of correcting of existing externalities, nor even compensating for them, as such an 
attempt leads to salvaging negative externalities by conceiving of them in terms of 
external economies which may in some way or other be internalized. While not 
denying the existence of positive externalities nor some need to manage inevitable 
negative external effects of a given action or transaction, the occurrence of certain 
externalities should be prevented at all costs. Diez (2018) provides a perfect example 
to this effect. He rightly observes that if a flight from Berlin to Cologne with a low-
cost airline costs about 15 euros, whereas a train journey 120 euros, then something 
goes basically wrong. Cheap flights are not human rights, but ecological disaster. 
“The market fails as an instance to do the right thing - the state must intervene to 
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establish a reasonable order. Flying exposes better than anything else the 
pathologies of contemporary capitalism” (ibid). 
 
5. From Uncontrolled Externalities to the Undermined Rule of Law 
 
Given their potent impact, externalities have also become a matter relevant for 
normative economics and economic ethics. According to Medema and Ferey (2014) 
“[i]t is thus a matter of economic ethics to discuss the types of values that a society 
should support and the types of externalities it should discourage as an alternative 
to the implementation of market solutions when transaction costs are too high or 
when they can be reduced through the development of collective values or social 
conventions. More broadly, the concept of externality conveys, at least implicitly, 
claims about the scope and boundaries of the market” (emphasis added). Once an 
undesirable externality occurs, though, the discussion about its consequences must 
inevitably embark on issues such as intentionality, responsibility, and causation 
attached to a person or other subject of law which is the source of such an 
externality. That is where externalities are of crucial importance not exclusively 
from the perspective of mainstream economics, but also law and policy-making. 
 
In contemporary judicial review-centered constitutionalism (Lustig and Weiler, 
2018) characterized by the existence within states of judicial mechanisms 
safeguarding constitutional review of state action, including democratically 
approved legislation, any political assault upon judicial autonomy undermines the 
rule of law. In other words, the main functions of the judiciary in maintaining liberal 
democracy, namely: the exercise of checks on the executive power and protection of 
individual human rights, may not be properly fulfilled if the judiciary does not enjoy 
sufficient independence from the legislative and executive powers. This said, let us 
focus on an aspect of the rule of law which is perhaps less evident, albeit more 
pertinent in view of the subject matter of the present study, namely: equality under 
the law.  
 
As aptly stated by Fukuyama (2018) “in liberal democracies, equality under the law 
does not result in economic or social equality. Discrimination continues to exist 
against a wide variety of groups, and market economies produce large inequalities 
of outcome. (…) Significant parts of their populations have suffered from stagnant 
incomes, and certain segments of society have experienced downward social 
mobility.” Not surprisingly, a certain feeling seems to have awakened in a 
considerable subsection of the population that the democratic system with its 
distinctive affection for liberal bargain has discredited itself as a political and socio-
economic order.  
 
As surprising, but even more significant the author perceives the success of populist 
nationalism in ballots held in 2016 by two of the world’s most ancient and durable 
liberal democracies, i.e. the United Kingdom with its Brexit vote and the United 
States with Donald Trump’s electoral upset in the race for presidency. Fukuyama 
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(2018) embraces the above described phenomena under an umbrella term of identity 
politics. In his view politics today is defined less by economic or ideological 
concerns than by questions of identity: “in many democracies, the left focuses less 
on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide 
variety of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, 
women, and LGBT people. The right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as 
the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly 
connected to race, ethnicity, or religion”. Such identity turn is by no means 
surprising given that the loss of economic status is perceived in terms of the loss of 
identity (ibid.).  
 
It seems plausible that the said identity orientation is a kind of reactionist response to 
the failure of the economic system which promotes concentration of wealth in ever 
fewer hands at the cost of the rest of the population. When the rate of return on 
capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income, capitalism automatically 
generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities, which in end-effect radically 
undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are founded 
(Piketty, 2014). Especially young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe lack 
resilience in the face of such phenomena. Under such conditions the fact that they 
are dangerously sliding back towards authoritarianismxiv may not be surprising.  
 
The undermining of the rule of law, however, is not limited to discrimination in 
socio-economic terms. An even more important aspect of this principle pertains to 
individual and social responsibility. In his work devoted to risk communities, Beck 
(2009) states that “[e]ven in the smallest conceivable microcosm, risk defines a 
social relation, a relation between at least two people: the decision-maker who takes 
the risk and who thereby triggers consequences for others who cannot, or can only 
with difficulty, defend themselves. Accordingly, two concepts of responsibility can be 
distinguished: an individual responsibility that the decision maker accepts for the 
consequences of his or her decision, which must be distinguished from responsibility 
for others, social responsibility. Risks pose in principle the question (which 
combines defence and devaluation) of what “side effects” a risk has for others and 
who these others are and to what extent they are involved in the decision or not” 
(emphasis added). What Beck means under such side-effects are nothing else than 
the externalities discussed in this paper. Moreover, as rightly stressed by the author, 
globalization implies a global space of responsibility where global risks open up “a 
complex moral and political space of responsibility in which the others are present 
and absent, near and far, and in which actions are neither good nor evil, only more 
or less risky. The meanings of proximity, reciprocity, dignity, justice and trust are 
transformed within this horizon of expectation of global risks” (ibid).  
 
An undeniable achievement of occidental legal culture is the prohibition of causing 
damage to other people, their private property or public property they use (most 
notably the environment, but not exclusively). This prohibition will not be effective 
if individuals causing damage to others will not be held liable for their acts. If they 
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are not forced to face all consequences of the damage they caused, they will not have 
motivation to refrain from such acts in the future. The liability of economic actors 
organized in form of corporations is in principle limited to the corporate capital. The 
“Supermanagers” (notably CEOs of multinational corporations) are bearing full 
responsibility for their action only in exceptional cases when found guilty of having 
committed a delictxv. Thus they are capable to control or abuse the rules of the 
economic game to their advantage. Limited or completely lacking liability on the 
part of economic agents that induce harm to the general public is undermining the 
basic principles of the rule of law (Stiglitz, 2015), decaying one of the core pillars of 
any democratic order. Lacking appropriate legal instruments establishing such 
liability “developed” societies are de facto privileging growth of the GDP over the 
values they explicitly uphold. 
 
A question arises whether European and other established democracies are doomed 
to democratic deconsolidation or whether democratic processes may still bring about 
a reversal of the 30-year trend toward greater socioeconomic inequality present in 
most liberal democracies Fukuyama (2018). Arguably, modern democracies dispose 
of sufficient institutional instruments to initiate a gradual transformation of 
themselves into more egalitarian polities. For the time being, however, neither is 
there a serious will to do so on the part of financial and political elites nor is such a 
transformation requested with unwavering insistence by a majority of the electorate. 
 
6. Re-embedding the Market within the Society and its Institutions  
 
There may nevertheless be good reasons for the financial and political elites to 
envisage in their own long-term interest a transformation of present day neo-liberal 
capitalism. The starting point of such a transformation could be the consensus e.g. 
existing within the European Union (cf. Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union) on the principle of a social market economy, the putting into 
practice of which would require to embed the market within the society.  
 
The concept of embeddedness of the market in the social as introduced by Karl 
Polanyi (1944)xvi is by no means a novelty in the economic theory. Alas, it remains 
of central interest for the discipline of economic sociology and the few devoted to 
challenging economic imperialism with its main underlying assumption of the self-
regulating market economy (Ashiagbor, 2013). Indeed the central message of 
Polanyi’s work is that the forces of the market are all but self-adjusting, and when 
left uncontrolled, they will annihilate the human and natural substance of society. 
Since unrestrained market liberalism leads inevitably to commodification of labor 
and environment, individuals need to be protected by means of anchoring markets 
within institutional regulation (ibid). Since the matrix of institutional structures may 
differ from state to state or within transnational market communities (such as e.g. the 
EU), the neo-Polanyian theory assumes that the market is never fully disembedded; 
on the contrary, we should rather speak of political economies regulated to a greater 
or lesser extent. In the same vein, liberalized markets at EU level are embedded in 
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varieties of institutional structures in Union member states, with the latter 
maintaining the competence to decide on forms and depth of state intervention to 
secure domestic stability. When under the drive of the forces of laissez-faire 
economic liberalism the principles of social protection are less and less 
implemented, were it at national or even less so at transnational level, the values 
upheld for many years seem to be rapidly decomposing.    
 
One of the fundamental elements of social embededness of the market is social 
embeddedness of property rights. Private property rights and guarantees for their 
respect are a cornerstone of liberal legal and economic systems. They have been 
established as fundamental rights enshrined under constitutional and international 
law. At the same time, in contemporary constitutional dogmatics and case-law, 
property rights are not construed as ’absolute’ rights, i.e. they belong to the category 
of subjective rights which may, under the conditions specified by law, be 
circumscribed or modified especially when externalities and/ or overriding social 
objectives are involved (for the German legal tradition, cf. e.g. Niebler 1982 and the 
case law cited therein).xvii For example, in the industrialized economies, the use of 
land is governed by zoning regulations and the permit process which may 
significantly limit the owner’s right to use the property in whatever way s/he pleases.  
 
It is typically at the discretion of local authorities to regulate and/ or restrict 
occupancy of lands for agriculture, residence, recreation, and other purposes. Other 
examples of commonly accepted legal limitations on an owner's real property rights 
involve: i) the interference with third party rightsxviii, i.e. with another property 
owner’s use or enjoyment of their own property (a private nuisance/ tort); ii) 
environmental laws and regulations addressing issues such as water quality, air 
quality, soil quality, and solid waste and iii) expropriation for a public purpose (on 
the condition that the owner is fairly compensated).xix  
 
Furthermore, it is by no means unusual to construe ownership not only in terms of 
rights but also duties. Such approach to property rights seems justified given that the 
entitled individual receives a stream of benefits from those rights, which has a direct 
impact on the distribution of wealth and income. By way of example, under Art. 
14(2) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) property entails obligation and 
its use shall also serve the public good.xx In other words, following Juan Elegido 
(1995), do I have a moral right to do with my property whatever I please irrespective 
of the pattern of wealth distribution in my society and the needs of others? As rightly 
pointed out by the author, depending on the conception of property rights that we 
assume (a strong presumption in favour of property-holders vs. justification of a 
degree of state intervention aimed at satisfying the demands of the common good 
and the needs of the less privileged members of the society), we will arrive at 
different views on how economic activities should be carried out. Hence the 
libertarian defence of the absolute conception of property rights as the only possible 
model will not stand. The duties of a property holder may be multifarious depending 
whether they relate to care for the environment, public welfare programs, 
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redistributive taxation, modalities of remunerating employees, charitable activity of 
companies, etc. (Elegido 1995, p. 412). 
 
Last but not least, many modern constitutional democracies recognize the concept of 
social justice as a defining fundament of social order. By way of example, under 
Article 2 of the Polish Constitution, “[t]he Republic of Poland shall be a democratic 
state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice.” The social 
justice principle, as conceived in any socio-economic and political system, may only 
be reconstructed on the basis of complementary law provisions and the relevant case 
law and doctrine. To provide at least two such complementary constitutional 
provisions under the law of Poland, Article 1 of the Polish Constitution stipulates 
that “[t]he Republic of Poland shall be the common good of all its citizens” 
(emphasis added). In turn, Article 20 of the Constitution reads: “A social market 
economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership, and 
solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the 
economic system of the Republic of Poland.” The cited provisions clearly 
demonstrate that the Polish people constituted a legal basis to embed the market in 
the non-economic institutions. However, a closer study of the constitutional 
provisions relating to social welfare unveils the embedded liberal bargain in so far as 
the said provisions are all formulated merely in terms of a mandatory state policy,xxi 
without any direct claim on the part of a citizen corresponding to it. Thus, the social 
element in the principle of social justice or social market economy remains a kind of 
antinomy to other constitutional principles, such as e.g. the freedom of economic 
activity, that are vested with subjective rights of the individual. It is thus granted a 
de facto weaker status amongst the conflicting constitutional norms.  
 
What is noteworthy, this approach to social welfare rights is by no means a Polish 
phenomenon. On the contrary, Western constitutional democracies consciously lay 
down social welfare rights by means of state policy obligations. This de facto frees 
national governments and courts from taking those principles more seriously in the 
case where they conflict with e.g. the economic freedoms. Such imbalance is 
considered here as unsatisfactory, especially where the markets are established on a 
larger than the national scale (e.g. the EU) or multilaterally by means of international 
agreements. In such cases the States concerned acting jointly would de jure posses 
the broadest (including judicial) faculties to counterbalance any adverse effects the 
enlarged market may produce but de facto seem to insufficiently make use of them. 
 
At the same time, nation states are no longer the only units for solving societal 
problems, as unilateral action not infrequently proves ineffective. “Interdependence 
is not a scourge of humanity but the precondition for its survival. (...) Effectiveness 
and legitimacy are products of cooperation among states” (Beck, 2009, p. 18). A 
good example to this effect is tax policy and countering the erosion of tax basis, both 
at national and transnational level. Ulrich Beck embraces the idea of post-national 
and global cooperation in terms of a cosmopolitan vision. The author states that 
“[c]osmopolitanism … is a vital theme of European civilization and European 
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consciousness and beyond that of global experience” (…) “in the cosmopolitan 
outlook (…) resides the latent potential to break out the self-centred narcissism of 
the national outlook and the dull incomprehension with which it infects thought and 
action, and thereby enlighten human beings concerning their real, internal 
cosmopolitanisation of their lifeworlds and institutions” (Beck, 2006, p. 2). As the 
example of the United Nations Organization shows, there is no direct path to 
cosmopolitanism and global governance. The establishment of a multilateral order 
by means of multilateral agreements amongst enlarged polities of continental or 
quasi-continental scale may, however, be a way forward.    
  
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The main contention of this paper is that the expansion of financial economy in 
liberal market economies (LMEs as conceived by Roberts and Kwon, 2017) not only 
fuels the accumulation of excessive risk in the system, but also produces unwelcome 
externalities in terms of reduced inclusiveness of economic policies and 
unsustainable inequalities. Notably the infamous privatizing the profits of banks, 
while socializing losses they yield undermines popular support for liberal values, 
also affecting the acceptance of social models of a democracy based on the rule of 
law and a market economy.  
 
Therefore we argue that backsliding democracies - for their recovery – are in need of 
a radical ring-fencing of markets by democratically accountable non-economic 
institutions and not, as proposed by Posner and Weyl (2018), radical markets. These 
authors not only revive the doubtful self-regulatory markets utopia, but also propose 
a pretended “democratic" system based on buying votes.  They totally ignore the fact 
that part of the population whose main concerns are focused on “bread and butter” 
would be effectively deprived of the possibility to vote. The explanation offered by 
the authors for the radical disproportion in the weight of influence by a single 
individual in a ballot under such system, namely that also under the current system 
the financial elites are benefitting of a similar effect (ibid.), ironically confirms the 
diktat of financial elites as assumed above. 
 
Given that waning support for democracy reflects social malaise rather than 
nostalgia for authoritarian rule, the only promising remedy for it would therefore be, 
as suggested by Howe, drawing people again into a new kind of social contract, 
restoring in them a sense of belonging to a society where principles constituting the 
foundation of their living together are to be respected and observed. To that end it is 
necessary for the public authority, at national, transnational and global level, to 
ensure first that all have a reasonable opportunity to succeed in life irrespective of 
their socioeconomic background. This would mean countering the excessive 
individualist ethos so characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies based on 
private property. This would mean developing a conception of macro- and micro-
economics that includes parameters evaluating and rewarding the respect of the 
common good and social balance. Robust civic education is a separate challenge 
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valuable in and of itself. Those never trained in solidarity and respect of the other, 
moreover “bereft of factual information may also lack the broader awareness that 
goes into appreciating the value of democracy and grasping the potential 
consequences should it fail” (Howe 2017, p. 26). 
 
The question of the financial markets’ contribution to democratic backsliding would 
merit a more comprehensive and systematic research that would need to go beyond 
the initial theoretical arguments sketched out in this paper. It was neither aspired nor 
attempted to discuss all instances where the current model of financialisation of 
economy may yield side effects of democratic backsliding. While we reject 
dogmatic approaches that take such impact for granted, we believe that the evidence 
put together in the present paper suffices to undermine presuppositions widespread 
in the economic discipline as to an alleged need of independence of the markets 
from the political and social spheres.  
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Notes: 
 
i For the United Kingdom a period of stagnation of real wages similar to Victorian ages is 
reported, average real wages in 2019 being lower than in 2008 and no higher than in 2005. In 
the United States median annual earnings in the Bretton Woods period steadily rose until just 
after 1970. Since then American male real wages stagnated throughout the age of 
globalisation and financial deregulation (see Pettifor, A. (2017).      
ii See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
iii By way of example, in December 2016 Italian Prime Minister M. Renzi put to public vote 
a constitutional reform which intended to curtail Senate’s power in the legislative process by 
transforming it from bicameral to by and large unicameral procedure. From the perspective 
of most bi-cameral constitutional systems in Europe where the upper chamber of parliament 
has long ceased to perform its corrective role in legislative process it may seem irrelevant for 
the political checks and balances outcome. However, the modalities of the Italian electoral 
system if not safeguard, than at least favor different power division in both chambers (the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), which in turn makes it more difficult for the 
government to impose its preferences which do not accept for a inter-party political 
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consensus. While such plans for constitutional reform, already approved by both Houses of 
Parliament were rejected by means of a referendum, the action undertaken by the 
Government set up in June 2018 with regard to migrants rescued at sea and the pursuit of EU 
policies seems to be in breach with the humanitarian and integrationist principles followed by 
all Italian governments since the overcoming of the fascist rule. In Germany the partisan 
behavior of police forces observed in August 2018 in certain Eastern parts of the country is 
pointing into the same direction, as it shows passivity when confronted with events of 
extremist uproar while over-zealous activism in restricting the freedom of journalists wishing 
to report on right-wing activities.  
iv The richest 10 per cent appropriated three-quarters of the total growth of the US economy. 
The richest 1 per cent absorbed almost 60 per cent of the total national income growth 
v February 2019, http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm. 
vi After the period between 1910-1950 which was marked by the most inegalitarian 
distribution of wealth in countries such as Argentina, India, Indonesia and South Africa (with 
the upper centile’s share in national income amounting to around 20 percent), the top 
centile’s share fell significantly between 1950-1980 (to 5-6 percent in India, 8-9 percent in 
Indonesia and Argentina and 11-12 percent in South Africa) to newly rebound after 1980s to 
about 15 percent of national income. 
vii India is said to have ceased publishing detailed tax data in the early 2000s, albeit such data 
had been available without interruption since 1922. 
viii The Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period. 
ix Commercial banks’ after-tax net income to yearly averaged total assets 
x All data retrieved from the World Development Indicators, accessed on January 8, 2020 
under https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#.  
xi Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, 11 January 1944, 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html. 
xii  On the contrary significant ecological damages requiring massive intervention may under 
current accounting methods even result in a tangible growth of the GDP. 
xiii On the concept of welfare economics, see e.g. Just et al. (2004). 
xiv In the context of the consolidation of power by the Law and Justice Party in Poland, 
Małgorzata Gersdorf, First President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland, in her 
speech before the Federal Court of Germany stated that “Poland continues to be a young 
democracy. As one of the weakest links in the European chain of nations, she is a litmus test 
for the condition of the entire European Union.” (Speech to Mark the Occasion of the 
Conference Organised by the Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof): Polish Rule of 
Law: Missed Opportunities?, Karlsruhe 19-20 July 2018). 
xv As shown by the escape of former Renault-Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn from Japanese arrest 
in the final days of 2019 such personalities still dispose of means not available to the general 
public for evading the judiciary. For a description of one of the most frequent abuses see: J. 
Useem (2017): The Stock-Buyback Swindle: American corporations are spending trillions of 
dollars to repurchase their own stock. The practice is enriching CEOs - at the expense of 
everyone else. 
xvi Polanyi’s major work, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]), as cited by Ashiagbor (2013, p. 304). 
xvii From the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court cited therein, notably 
BVerfGE 24, 367 [389], Urteil vom 18 Dezember 1968 zum Hamburgischen 
Deichordnungsgesetz. 
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xviii Cf. e.g. German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [German Cicil Code] § 903.  
xix By way of example, under Article 21 of the Polish Constitution, the Republic of Poland 
shall protect ownership and the right of succession. Expropriation may be allowed solely for 
public purposes and for just compensation. 
xxhttps://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_01/24512
2 (June 19, 2019). 
xxi For instance, Art. 70(4) of the Polish Constitution stipulates that: “Public authorities shall 
ensure universal and equal access to education for citizens”, or Art. 74(1): "Public authorities 
shall pursue policies ensuring the ecological security of current and future generations.” 
